In order to develop a model that …ts both business cycles and asset pricing facts, this paper introduces a small, time-varying risk of economic disaster in an otherwise standard real business cycle model. This simple feature can generate large and volatile risk premia. Under some conditions, the risk of disaster does not a¤ect the path of macroeconomic aggregates, but in general it does:
The paper is organized as follows: the rest of the introduction reviews the literature. Section 2 studies a simple analytical example in an AK model which can be solved in closed form. Section 3 gives the setup of the full model and presents some analytical results. Section 4 studies the quantitative implications of the model numerically.
Literature Review
This paper is mostly related to three strands of literature. First, a large literature in …nance builds and estimates models which attempt to match not only the equity premium and the risk-free rate, but also the predictability of returns and potentially the term structure. Two prominent examples are Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . However, this literature is limited to endowment economies, and hence is of limited use to analyze the business cycle or to study policy questions.
Second, a smaller literature studies business cycle models (i.e. they endogenize consumption, investment and output), and attempts to match not only business cycle statistics but also asset returns …rst and second moments. My project is closely related to these papers (A non-exhaustive list would include Jermann (1998) Most of these papers consider only the implications of productivity shocks, and generally study only the mean and standard deviations of return, and not the predictability of returns. Many of these papers abstract from hours variation. Several of these papers note that quantities dynamics are una¤ected by risk aversion, 4 hence it is sometimes said that matching asset pricing facts need not a¤ect the business cycle implications of the model. Recently some authors have also tried to generate time-varying risk premia in monetary models (e.g. Rudebusch (2008a and 2008b) ). The long-run target is to have a medium-scale DSGE model (as in Smets and Wouters (2003) or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) ) that is roughly consistent with asset prices.
Finally, the paper draws from the recent literature on "disasters" or rare events (Rietz (1988) , Barro (2006) , Barro and Ursua (2008) , Gabaix (2007) , Farhi and Gabaix (2008) , Martin (2007) are relatively easy to embed into a standard macroeconomic model.
The project will also relate its …ndings to the empirical …nance literature discussed above linking risk premia and the business cycle. There has been much interest lately in the evidence that the stock market leads TFP and GDP, which has motivated introducing "news shocks"(e.g., Beaudry and Portier (2006) , Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008)), but my model suggests that this same evidence could also be rationalized by shocks to risk premia (i.e. shocks to the probability of disasters).
Last, the paper has the same ‡avor as Bloom (2008) in that an increase in aggregate uncertainty creates a recession, but the mechanism and the focus of the paper -asset prices-is di¤erent.
quantity dynamics remain almost unchanged. In Tallarini's world, macroeconomists might well not have noticed the need for large risk aversion." 4 Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2008) use perturbation methods and report that the …rst three terms are independent of risk aversion (there is, of course, a steady-state adjustment).
A simple analytical example in an AK economy
To highlight a key mechanism of the paper, consider a simple economy with a representative consumer who has Epstein-Zin preferences, i.e. his utility V t satis…es the recursion:
where C t is consumption; note that measures risk aversion towards static gambles, is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) and re ‡ects time preference. 5 This consumer has access to an AK technology:
where Y t is output, K t is capital, and A t is a stochastic technology which is assumed to follow a stationary
Markov process with transition Q: The resource constraint is:
The economy is randomly hit by disasters. A disaster destroys a share b k of the capital stock. This could be due to a war which physically destroys capital, to expropriation of capital holders (e.g. if the capital is taken away and then not used as e¤ectively), or it could be a "technological revolution" that makes a large share of the capital worthless. The law of accumulation for capital is thus:
where x t+1 is a binomial variable which is 1 with probability p t and 0 with probability 1 p t : The probability of disaster p t is assumed to vary over time, but to maintain tractability I assume in this section that it is i:i:d:: p t , the probability of a disaster at time t + 1; is drawn at time t from a constant cumulative distribution function F: A disaster does not a¤ect productivity A t . 6 Finally, I assume that p t+1 ; A t+1 ; and x t+1 are independent.
This model has one endogenous state K and two exogenous states A and p; and there is one control variable C: The Bellman equation for the representative consumer is:
s:t: :
De…ne W (K; A; p) = V (K; A; p)
1
. Then we can guess and verify that W is of the form W (K; A; p) = (1 ) (A i)
where i = I K is the investment rate. 7 The …rst-order condition with respect to i yields, after rearranging:
Given the assumption that p is i:i:d:, the expectation of g next period is independent of the current p.
Hence, assuming that risk aversion 1, i is increasing in p if and only > 1 i.e. the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than unity. The intuition for this result is as follows: 8 if p goes up, the expected risk-adjusted return on capital 1 p + p(1 b k )
goes down since there is a higher risk of disaster. However, the e¤ect of a change in the expected return on the consumption/savings choice depends on the value of the IES, because of o¤setting wealth and substitution e¤ects. If the IES is unity (i.e. utility is log), savings are unchanged and thus the savings or investment rate does not respond to a change in the probability of disaster. But if the IES is larger than unity, the substitution e¤ect dominates, and i is decreasing in p (under the maintained assumption that 1). Hence, an increase in the probability of disaster leads initially, in this model, to a decrease in investment and an increase in consumption (since output is unchanged on impact). In the subsequent periods, the decrease in investment leads to a decrease in the capital stock and hence in output. This simple analytical example thus shows that a change in the perceived probability of disaster can lead to a decline in investment and output. While the preceding example is revealing, 9 a serious examination of the role of beliefs regarding disasters requires a quantitative model.
Quantitative model: a RBC model with disasters
This section introduces a real business cycle model with time-varying risk of disaster and study its implications, …rst analytically, and then numerically. This model extends the simple example of the previous section in the following dimensions: (a) the probability of disaster is not i:i:d: but can be persistent; (b) the production function is neoclassical; (c) labor is elastically supplied; (d) disasters may a¤ect total factor productivity as well as capital; (e) there are capital adjustment costs.
Model Setup
The representative consumer has preferences of the Epstein-Zin form, and the utility index incorporates hours worked N t as well as consumption C t :
where the per period felicity function u(C; N ) is assumed to have the following form:
7 Note that if > 1 the max needs to be transformed into a min. 8 This intuition is similar to that spelled out in Weil (1989) in a consumption-savings example with exogenous returns. 9 This example is related to work by Epaulard and Pommeret (2003) , Siu (2005a, 2005b) , and to the earlier work of Obstfeld (1994). 1 0 Future work will consider di¤erent speci…cations, e.g. with a higher elasticity of labor supply.
There is a representative …rm, which produces output using a standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
where z t is total factor productivity (TFP), to be described below. The …rm accumulates capital subject to adjustment costs:
where is a concave function, which curvature captures adjustment costs, and x t+1 is 1 if there is a disaster at time t + 1 (with probability p t ) and 0 otherwise (probability 1 p t ). The resource constraint is
Finally, we describe the shock processes. Total factor productivity is a¤ected by the "business cycles"
normal shocks " t as well as jumps (disasters). A disaster reduces TFP by a permanent amount b z :
log z t+1 = log z t + + " t+1 ; if x t+1 = 0;
where is the drift of TFP, and is the standard deviation of small "business cycles" shocks. Moreover, p t follows a stationary Markov process with transition Q: I assume that p t+1 ; " t+1 ; and x t+1 are independent conditional on p t : This assumption requires that the occurrence of a disaster today does not a¤ect the probability of a disaster tomorrow. 
Bellman Equation
This model has three states: capital K, technology z and probability of disaster p, and two independent controls: consumption C and hours worked N . Denote V (K; z; p) the value function, and de…ne
The social planning problem can be formulated as:
1 1 This assumption could be wrong either way: a disaster today may indicate that the economy is entering a phase of low growth or is less resilient than thought; but on the other hand, if a disaster occurred today, and capital or TFP fell by a large amount, it is unlikely that they will fall again by a large amount next year. Rather, historical evidence suggests that the economy is likely to grow above trend for a while (Gourio (2008) ). Future work will study the implications of relaxing these independence assumptions. 1 2 Here too, if > 1 the max needs to be transformed into a min.
A standard homogeneity argument implies that we can write W (K; z; p) = z (1 )c
(1
Here c = C=z and i = I=z are detrended consumption and investment, respectively. This Bellman equation will lead to some analytical results, and can further be studied using standard numerical methods.
Asset Prices
It is straightforward to compute asset prices in this economy. The stochastic discount factor is given by the formula
The price of a purely risk-free asset is
Following Barro (2006), I will assume that government bonds are not risk-free but are subject to default risk during disasters. 13 More precisely, if there is a disaster, then with probability q the bonds will default and the recovery rate will be r: The T-Bill price can then be easily computed as
Computing the yield curve is conceptually easy using the standard recursion for zero-coupon bonds:
The ex-dividend value of the …rm F t is de…ned through the value recursion:
where D t = F (K t ; z t N t ) w t N t I t is the payout of the representative …rm, and w t is the wage rate.
This value satis…es the q theoretic relation:
so that if we de…ne Tobin's q as
Kt ; and Q t is one in the limiting case of no adjustment costs. In the standard model, p = 0, but here the amount of capital available tomorrow is unknown, since some capital may be destroyed if there is a disaster. Finally, the equity return is obtained as
Using equation (6), we can …nd an equivalent expression for the equity return, the investment return:
This expression is similar to that in Jermann (1998) or Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2008) , but for the presence of the term (1 x t+1 b k ), which re ‡ects the capital destruction following a disaster. Finally, I
will also compute the price of two additional assets, a levered claim to consumption, de…ned by its payo¤ C t , where is a leverage parameter, and a levered claim to dividends, de…ned by its payo¤ D 
: Moreover, assuming > 1; < if and only if < 1: Asset prices, however, will be di¤ erent under the two models.
is independent of the realization of disaster
Hence, we can rewrite the Bellman equation as
(1 )c
i.e.:
Finally note that the term in 1 is purely a utility normalization, which can be taken out. Hence, we see that this is the same Bellman equation as the one in a standard neoclassical model, with discount rate : As a result, the policy functions c = C=z, i = I=z; etc. are the same, so the implied quantities are the same, as long as no disaster occurs. 17 Asset prices, on the other hand, are driven by the stochastic discount factor, which has the following expression (see the computational appendix):
:::
and of course the term z 0 =z depends on the realization of a disaster x 0 .
Discussion of Result 1: This result is in the spirit of Tallarini (2000): …xing the asset pricing properties of a RBC model may not lead to any change in the quantity dynamics. 18 An economy with a high equity risk premium (p > 0) is observationnally equivalent to the standard stochastic growth model (p = 0), with a di¤erent : The assumption that b k = b tf p simpli…es the analysis: the steady-state of the economy shifts due to a change in z, but the ratio of capital to productivity is una¤ected by the disaster, i.e. the economy is in the same position relative to its steady-state after the disaster and before the disaster. As a result, if we start in the steady-state of the economy, a disaster will simply reduce investment, output, and consumption by a factor b, and hours will stay constant.
Without the adjustment of , the quantity implications are very slightly di¤erent. This is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 3 which depicts the impulse response of quantities to a TFP shock in three models: (a) the model with p = 0, (b) the model with constant positive p, and (c) the benchmark calibration with time-varying p: The di¤erences can be seen in the scale (y-axis), but they are tiny. For this case, :9893, which is very close to = :99:Of course, asset prices will be di¤erent, and in particular the equity premium will be higher, as seen in the bottom panel of Figure 1 -the average returns are very di¤erent across the three models. The observational equivalence is broken in a long enough sample since disasters must occur; or if one can trade assets contingent on disasters, since the prices would be di¤erent under the two models.
Note that this same result implies that the steady-state level of capital stock (i.e., if the variance of " is zero) will be changed, too. If risk aversion is greater than unity, then < if and only if < 1;
i.e. an IES above unity. In this case, the lower risk-adjusted return leads people to save less, which decreases the steady-state capital stock.
While this result is interesting, it is not fully satisfactory however, since the constant probability of disaster implies (nearly) constant risk premia. This motivates extending the result for a time-varying p:
Proposition 2 Assume still that b k = b tf p ; but let now p vary over time. Then, in a sample without disaster, the quantities implied by the model are the same as those implied by a model with no disasters, but with stochastic discounting (i.e. follows an exogenous stochastic process).
Proof. This follows from a similar argument: rewrite the Bellman equation as:
; we have:
i.e. the Bellman equation of a model with time-varying p:
Discussion of result 2: Result 2 shows that the time-varying risk of disaster has the same implications for quantities as a preference shock. It is well known that these shocks have signi…cant e¤ect on macroeconomic quantities (a point we will quantify later). Hence, this version of the model breaks the "separation theorem"of Tallarini (2000): the source of time-varying risk premia in the model will a¤ect quantity dynamics.
This result is interesting in light of the empirical literature which suggests that "preference shocks" may be important (e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003) When b k 6 = b tf p , the analytical results above do not hold. It is important to recognize that these disasters have di¤erent e¤ect both in terms of the responses following a disaster, and in terms of their e¤ect on steady-states (i.e. when no disaster is realized). The capital destruction acts like a reduction in the return on capital (risk-adjusted) so its e¤ect on capital accumulation depends on the value of the IES. The TFP disaster, on the other hand, has a standard precautionary savings e¤ect.
To understand the e¤ect of disasters when b k 6 = b tf p , it is useful to …rst consider the e¤ect on the steady-state of capital, in a simple special case: expected utility ( = ), inelastic labor, no adjustment costs, no shock "; and a constant probability of disaster. In this case, the Bellman equation reads
Taking the …rst-order condition with respect to i yields:
where i(k) is the optimal investment given the current k. The envelope condition is, for all k > 0 :
Combining the two equations yields:
Consider a long sample path where no disasters are realized. Then, the level of capital converges to the value k; and i to i which satisfy:
where
: Hence, if = 1 we …nd a special case of Proposition 1: k satis…es the adjusted user-cost rule:
Equation (7) shows the forces which determine the "steady-state" capital level k: On the one hand, a high b k reduces the return on capital. On the other hand, it increases the marginal value of a unit of The e¤ect of a change in b tf p is more standard: an increase in b tf p leads to larger precautionary savings and an increase in the stock of capital. These comparative statics are useful, because when we explore the e¤ect of a change in the probability of disaster, a central e¤ect is that the economy tries to alter its capital stock from one steady-state to another (up or down, depending on the composition of disaster in b k and in b tf p ), which determines the investment and output responses.
Quantitative Results
In general of course, the model cannot be solved analytically, so I resort to a numerical approximation.
Of course, a nonlinear method is crucial to analyze time-varying risk premia. I use a simple value function iteration (or policy function iteration) algorithm, which is described in detail in an Appendix.
This section …rst presents the calibration, which is still preliminary. Next, I study the implications of the model for business cycle quantities and for the …rst and second moments of asset returns. Finally, I discuss the cyclicality of asset returns.
Calibration
Parameters are listed in Table 1 . (This calibration and quantitative results are still preliminary and can likely be improved.) Many parameters are fairly standard (see e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995) ).
Risk aversion is 8, but note that this is the risk aversion over the consumption-hours bundle. Since the share of consumption in the utility index is .3, the e¤ective risk aversion is less than 3. Since hours does not vary much when there is a disaster, this utility index is about three times less volatile than consumption. The IES is set equal to 2, and adjustment costs are zero in the baseline model. One crucial element is the probability and size of disaster. As in Barro (2006) , I assume that b k = b tf p = :43 and the probability is p = :017 per year on average. (Barro actually uses the historical distribution of sizes of disaster. In his model, this distribution is equivalent to a single disaster with size 43%.) The second crucial element is the persistence and volatility of movements in this probability of disaster. For now I simply assume that this change in probability of disaster is volatile and highly persistent: = :98
and " = :015: This is motivated by the results in Gourio (2008b) and Wachter (2008) who show that in an endowment economy, these parameters are necessary to match the stock market volatility. Finally, the leverage parameters and 2 are both set equal to 3.
On top of this benchmark computation, I will also present results from di¤erent calibrations (no disasters, constant probability of disasters, and di¤erent b k and b tf p ) to illustrate how the model works. if the economy was close to the steady-state before the disaster, it will be close to a new steady-state with lower TFP and lower capital after the disaster. Hence, a disaster will simply reduce investment, output, and consumption by a factor b, and hours will stay constant.
The case of a capital disaster is interesting because it leads endogenously to a recovery. The return on capital is low on impact because of the destruction, but consumption does not fall that much given the anticipated recovery. Adding adjustment costs slows down the recovery, but makes the return on capital not as bad since marginal Q increases after the disaster.
Finally, a TFP disaster without a capital destruction leads to a situation where the economy has too much capital relative to its productivity. Investment falls to zero: the aggregate irreversibility constraint binds. Consumption and output fall over time. 19 In that case, the initial low return on capital is solely due to the binding irreversibility constraint.
The dynamic e¤ect of a TFP shock
As illustrated in …gure 3, the dynamics of quantities in response to a TFP shock are similar to those of a standard model without disasters. Consumption, investment and employment are procyclical, and investment is the most volatile series. The T-bill rate is procyclical, as is the equity return and Tobin's q: The equity premium is acyclical. 20 These dynamics are very similar for all the calibrations considered here. (The only di¤erence is that large adjustment costs tend to make employment countercyclical, as noted in Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001)).
4.2.3
The dynamic e¤ect of a shock to the probability of disaster
We can now perform the key experiment of a downward "shock" to the probability of disaster, which leads to a decrease in risk premia. Figure 6 plots the (nonlinear) impulse response function to such a shock. 21 Investment increases, and consumption falls, as in the analytical example of section 2, since the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be greater than unity. Employment increases too, through an intertemporal substitution e¤ect: the risk-adjusted return to savings is high and thus working today is more attractive. (This is in spite of a positive wealth e¤ect.) Hence, output increases because both employment and the capital stock increase, even though there is no change in current or future total factor productivity. This is one of the main result: this shock to the "perceived risk" leads to a boom.
After impact, total resources available grow, and so does consumption. These results are robust to changes in parameter values, except of course for the IES which crucially determines the sign of the responses, and the composition of disaster. 22 The size of adjustment costs a¤ects the magnitude of the response of investment and hours. 23 The model predicts some negative comovement between C and I, which is reminiscent of Barro and King (1984) , but the quantitative signi…cance of this point depends on the labor supply speci…cation.
Regarding asset prices, …gure 7 reveals that following the shock, the risk premium on equity decreases, the yield curve becomes downward-sloping, and the short rate increases. Hence, in the model, a reduction in risk premia leads to an economic expansion. Of course, on impact there is a reduction in risk premia, so equity prices move up. The e¤ect is moderate (or even tiny) for an unlevered equity, but can be huge for a levered equity. shocks are permanent and the IES is not small. 2 1 The …gure plots the path implied by the model, starting in steady-state, if, at t = 6, the economy shifts from the low probability of disaster to the high probability of disaster. For clarity, there are no further shocks to the probability of disaster, no realized disaster, and no "normal shocks" ": 2 2 If the disaster only a¤ects TFP, then an increase in the probability of disaster leads to more savings and hence a boom -the opposite sign of what is shown here; and this appears to be true regardless of the IES. This is consistent with the comparative statics for the average level of capital discussed in section 2.5. 2 3 The model predicts some negative comovement between C and I, which is reminiscent of Barro and King (1984) , but the quantitative signi…cance of this point depends on the labor supply speci…cation. Table 2 reports the standard business cycle moments obtained from model simulations for a sample without disasters. (Table 3 presents the same statistics in a full sample, i.e. a sample with disasters.)
First and second moments of asset returns and quantities
Overall, the standard business cycle moments are largely preserved in this model -consumption is less volatile than output, and investment is more volatile than output. The volatility of hours is low, a standard defect of the basic RBC model given this labor supply speci…cation.
Introducing a constant probability of disaster does not change the moments signi…cantly (consistent with the IRF shown in the previous section). However, the presence of the new shock -a change in the probability of disaster -leads to additional dynamics. Speci…cally, the correlation of consumption with output is reduced. Consumption and employment become somewhat more volatile. When the disaster only a¤ect TFP, these e¤ects are very strong.
Turning to returns, for a levered equity. Note that these risk premium are obtained with a risk aversion over consumption which is less than 3. Moreover, these risk premia are computed over short-term government bonds, which are not riskless in the model. Of course, without disasters, the model generates very small equity premia. Finally, whether these risk premia are calculated in a sample with disasters or without disasters does not matter much quantitatively -the risk premia are reduced by 15-20 basis point per quarter (see table 5 ).
The model generates a slightly negative term premium, consistent with the evidence for indexed bonds in the US and UK. In this model, the yield curve is similar to that of a Vacijek model, i.e.
long-term bond prices are more stable than short-term bond prices, and are mostly a¤ected by shocks to the probability of disaster (a mean-reverting state variable). However, the model does not generate enough volatility in the term premium.
The model also does not generate enough volatility in unlevered equity returns (only 9 basis points in a sample without disasters). The intuition is that shocks to the probability of disaster a¤ect the risk-free rate and the equity premium in roughly similar ways, so that equity prices and average returns are not much a¤ected by it. The volatility is signi…cantly higher in a sample with disasters (2.12% per quarter). These results are quite similar to Gourio (2008b) and Wachter (2008) . Adding some …nancial or operating leverage, and possibly some wage rigidities may help here. Rather than incorporating in detail all these mechanisms, I consider the implications of the model for a claim to levered equity or levered consumption. In this case, we …nd that the volatility is of the right order of magnitude: 5.01% and 3.67% per quarter. Overall, I conclude that the model does a good job at …tting the …rst two moments of asset returns, if one allows for some leverage.
Asset prices lead the business cycle
While most of the research has focused on the equity premium and the stock market volatility puzzle, the cyclicality of asset prices is also intriguing. Three facts stand out. First, the stock market return (or excess return) leads the business cycle. Second, the term spread leads the business cycle. Third, the short rate negatively leads the business cycle. Figure 8 illustrates these facts by plotting the crosscorrelogram of the growth rate of industrial production, with the short rate, the yield spread, the stock market return, and the stock market excess return. (Data sources are in appendix; the black lines show the two standard error bands. 24 Using employment, consumption or personal income as measures of economic activity rather than industrial production yields a similar picture.) These facts have been documented for a long time. 25 Indeed, the cyclicality of interest rates is often taken to mean that monetary policy is creating, or reacting to, the business cycle.
Standard business cycle model are unable to replicate these facts however. I illustrate this by showing the correlogram implied by a model with no disasters (keeping the same calibration as in the benchmark model). Figure 9 shows that the model misses essentially all of these correlations, because risk premia are nearly constant.
An interesting feature of the model is its ability to improve along this dimension. Figure 10 shows the cross-correlogram implied by the benchmark model. For clarity, this is computed when there are no TFP shocks, so the only impulse here is the probability of disaster shock. (The true correlogram is, naturally, a mix of the correlogram for TFP shocks and for shocks to the probability of disaster.) The model replicates roughly the fact that the term spread, the stock market return and excess return, and the short rate lead output. The intuition is as follows: a shift from high to low probability of disaster leads to an immediate reduction in risk premia, but output is a¤ected in part with a lag. Following the shock, GDP growth falls, while the term spread is inverted, and the stock market excess return is lower.
The risk-free rate is higher due to lower precautionary savings. Hence, the model …ts the facts because it generates some dynamic response of output to a shock to the probability of disaster.
Conclusions and Future Work
This work shows how introducing disasters into a standard RBC model both improves its …t of asset return data, and creates some interesting new macroeconomic dynamics. Clearly the model still fails quantitatively in some dimensions (e.g. the volatility of the term premium), which may be overcome by a richer calibration or allowing for some additional frictions. However, the results are attractive given the parsimony of the model.
There are several possible interesting extensions. First, it would be interesting to consider the e¤ect of a time-varying risk of disaster in a richer business cycle model, e.g. one with collateral e¤ects or choice of …nancial leverage, or a standard New Keynesian model. Second, one could also consider alternative modeling of the dynamics of disasters (e.g. persistence in low growth regimes, recoveries following disasters, and learning about the disaster state or about the disaster probability). Third, a change in the aggregate risk a¤ects macroeconomic aggregates also by a¤ecting the willingness to take on risk. This seems an interesting mechanism to explore: faced with an increase in the probability of an economic disaster, investors shift resources to technologies and projects which are less exposed to disasters. In doing so, they move the economy alongside a risk/return frontier, and pick projects which are less risky but also have lower expected returns. As a result, the expected output of the economy falls, and so does productivity.
Appendix

Computational Method
This method is presented for the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, and a Cobb-Douglas utility function, but it can be used for arbitrary homogeneous of degree one production function and utility function. The Bellman equation for the "rescaled" problem is:
Here too, the max needs to be transformed in a min if > 1: To approximate numerically the solution of this problem, I proceed as follows:
(1) Pick a grid for k; and a grid for i, and approximate the process for p with a Markov chain with transition matrix Q: Discretize the normal shock ", with probabilities ("): I used 120 points for the grid for k, 1200 points for the grid for i, 2 points for the grid for p, and 5 points for the grid for ":
(2) Compute for any k; i in the grid the value N (k; i) which solves
:
The state space and action space are now discrete, so this is a standard dynamic discrete programing problem, which can be rewritten as follows, with one endogenous state, one exogenous state, and two additional shocks: a binomial variable x equal to one if a disaster occurs (probability p) and the normal shock ":
where pr(x 0 ; p) = p1 x 0 =1 + (1 p) 1 x 0 =0 = px 0 + (1 p)(1 x 0 ): I solve this Bellman equation using modi…ed policy iteration (Judd (1998) , p. 416), starting with a guess value close to zero. 26 Recursive utility implies that the Blackwell su¢ cient conditions do not hold here, hence it is not obvious that the Bellman operator is a contraction. Note that to compute the expectation, we need the value function outside the grid points. I use linear interpolation in the early steps of the iteration, then switch to spline interpolation. The motivation is that linear interpolation is more robust, hence it is easier to make the iterations converge; but spline interpolation is more precise.
(4) Given g; we have V (K; z; p) = z g(k; p)
We also obtain the policy functions C = zc(k; p), I = zi(k; p); N = N (k; p); and the output policy function Y = zk N (k; p) 1 : (5) To compute asset prices, we need the stochastic discount factor, which is given by the standard formula:
Using homogeneity, the SDF between two states s = (k; p) and s 0 = (k 0 ; p 0 ) is:
Note that we …rst need to compute the conditional expectation which appears on the denominator of the last term. Denote k 0 = j(k; p; " 0 ; x 0 ) the detrended capital next period, wich depends on the detrended investment i(k; p) and on the realization of the shocks next period " 0 and x 0 (but not p 0 ). The conditional expectation is obtained as:
We can now obtain the price of a one-period asset, with payo¤ d(k 0 ; z 0 ; p 0 ; x 0 ; " 0 ): e.g. a pure riskfree asset d = 1; or a short-term government bond:
For instance, for a pure risk-free asset, the formula is:
Next, we can obtain the term structure of interest rates on government bonds, using the recursion:
where b(1 r) is the expected loss rate of government bonds during disasters. It is assumed that government bonds are risk-free if there is no disaster.
(8), Finally, we can compute the price of equity claims. I consider three types of "equities". De…ne the representative …rm's dividend as earnings less investment:
(i) The …rst equity is simply a claim to the stream fD t g : Let F t denote its price, which satis…es the standard recursion:
Note that D t can be written as
Hence, we can rewrite the …rm value recursion as:
The equity return is then
To solve the recursion 8 in practice, I iterate starting with an initial guess f (k; p) = 0: The recursion can be rewritten as:
::: 0
This conditional expectation can be written down, as
Note that a standard argument homogeneity argument (essentially, Hayashi's theorem; see Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2008) for instance) implies that the ex-dividend …rm value is:
Kt : Substituting this in the return equation (9) yields
This expression can be calculated using the quantities produced by the model in step (3) . In practice it is useful to check that the results obtained using this method are the same as the results using the value F t :
The second and third types of equity assume respectively that the payo¤ streams are C t and n D 
Data Sources
For the cross-correlogram: the stock market return is from CRSP (value-weighted including dividends).
The short rate is from Ken French's website. The yield curve is from the Fama-Bliss data (1 to 5 years).
The industrial production data is from FRED (series nickname INDPRO). I also used di¤erent monthly series to measure economic activity: employment (nickname PAYEMS), disposable income (DSPIC96), consumption (PCE96). All these series are monthly, and the data ranges from January 1959 to December
2007.
For the business cycle and return moments of Tables 2-7 : consumption is nondurable + services consumption, investment is …xed investment, and output is GDP, from the NIPA Sample with disasters Quarterly data. This is based on a full sample (i.e., including disasters). rho(C,Y) and rho(I,Y) are the correlation of the growth rate of C and of Y, and I of Y, respectively. Data sources in appendix.
Sample without disasters Sample with disasters Table 7 : Standard deviation of returns implied by the model for (a) pure risk-free asset, (b) a onequarter govt bond, (c) a claim to dividends (d) a leveraged claim on consumption (e) a leveraged claim on dividends (f) the di¤erence between the long-term yield and the short-term yield. Quarterly data.
This is based on a full sample (i.e., including disasters). Data sources in appendix. Response to a shock to the probability of disaster: quantities i k y c n Figure 6 : Impulse response of macroeconomic quantities to a shock to the probability of disaster at t = 5: The probability of disaster goes from the high state to the low state. Bond yields short rate long rate Figure 7 : Impulse response of asset returns to a shock to the probability of disaster at t = 5: The probability of disaster goes from the high state to the low state. The left panel shows the return on the pure risk-free asset, the equity asset, and a levered claim to consumption. The right panel shows the short (1 quarter) and long (20 quarters) yields. 
